Can grammar embrace emotions?

Abstract

In this discussion note, I notice an asymmetry in the argumentation used by Martina Wiltschko against considering emotions to be part of grammar: When examining the semantic import of grammatical constructions, emotional meanings are viewed as secondary, as “not entering grammar”, if the constructions in question can sometimes be used without expressing the emotional attitude associated with them. Referential and cognitive meanings, by contrast, are grandfathered in, without any attempt to put them to a similar test. I briefly discuss the example of the Russian diminutive, as a case in which the referential meaning of a construction (smallness) would not fare better than the emotional one (endearment) if the two were compared to one another on an equal footing. I argue that the divergent treatment of these two types of meaning is not motivated by the empirical data but rather reflects a deep theoretical commitment. I conclude by pointing out that if emotions are less ‘at home’ in grammar than referential meanings, this has more to do with the way grammar has been traditionally conceived of than with the nature of human emotions.